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 Since Nick Griffin’s appointment as chairman of the far-right British National Party 
(BNP) in 1999, the party has undergone a drastic makeover in terms of the language it 
employs in the public domain, adopting a moderate discourse of unobjectionable 
“motherhood and apple pie” concepts, whilst privately maintaining its core ideology of racial 
prejudice.  This paper continues the work previously done examining BNP literature in order 
to ascertain what discursive techniques the BNP is adopting and how their language is 
changing to appeal to a wider electoral base.  Using Corpus Analysis as a base, and drawing 
upon techniques of Discourse Analysis (DA) and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), this 
study compares the 2005 and 2010 BNP manifestos. Its focus is the way in which “in-group” 
categories such as nationhood are invoked to imply inclusivity yet on closer inspection are 
racially defined.  The project of disguising BNP racism in seemingly moderate discourse is 
continuing apace.   
Abstract 
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 In 1998, BNP leader Nick Griffin was found guilty of inciting racial hatred and 
handed a two-year suspended sentence for producing the anti-Semitic booklet “Who are the 
Mindbenders?” (Camus, 2005), citing an international Jewish conspiracy.  However, on 
becoming party leader in 1999, he soon made it clear to the party that his intention was to 
adopt a less direct discursive approach.  In an article in the Spring 1999 issue of the BNP 
magazine Patriot, Griffin stated “Nothing is easier for a group of isolated true believers than 
to create a fundamentalist programme of ideological perfection which positively petrifies 
ordinary voters” (Copsey 2004, p.175).  He added: “Of course, we must teach the truth to the 
hardcore [but] when it comes to influencing the public, forget about racial differences, 
genetics, Zionism, historical revisionism and so on” (Copsey 2007, p.68).  In their place, 
Griffin suggested four “idealistic, unobjectionable, motherhood and apple pie concepts” such 
as “freedom”, “democracy”, “security” and “identity” – a concept lifted from Jean-Marie Le 
Pen’s Front National (ibid.).  This was the beginning of the transformation which saw the 
BNP’s public discourse altered dramatically, in a process which is ongoing. However, 
undercover journalists continued to expose the true racist character of private BNP discourse 
in programmes such as the BBC’s “The Secret Agent”, aired 15th July 2004, attracting four 
million viewers and resulting in the arrest of Griffin and 11 others on charges of inciting 
racial hatred (Copsey, 2007, p.72).   
1. Introduction 
 In 2005, the party’s first serious attempt at publishing a manifesto (which was only 
available in electronic format) was to be an ideological sea change which would present the 
new mainstream and electable image, yet was still  considered by the vast majority of outside 
commentators to be “unquestionably racist and fascist” (Pitcher, 2006, p.537).  In 2009, the 
party’s constitution was ruled illegal on grounds of racial discrimination ("BNP faces legal 
action over membership and constitution." The Daily Telegraph, 29th July, 2009).  The BNP 
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has thus both voluntarily shifted its discourse in order to attract a wider section of the 
electorate and avoid alienating voters, and also been forced to adapt its language for legal 
reasons.  The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to examine how the language of the BNP has 
altered between the two manifestos in order to judge how it is communicating the same 
message of racial prejudice in more electorally palatable discourse.  This is especially 
pertinent due to the “latent support” factor uncovered by John & Margetts (2009), who 
suggest that results showing only electoral victories fail to reveal the “dulling” of negative 
feelings towards the BNP.  Their research showed dramatic falls in the number of people 
reporting that they “could never” vote BNP, and rises in the “might vote” and ambivalent 
“don’t know” categories.  For this reason it is currently of huge importance to monitor the 
manner in which the BNP is adapting its discourse to appeal to a wider demographic.         
 General accounts of the BNP’s rise and the quest for legitimacy do not come any 
more comprehensive than Copsey’s “Contemporary British Fascism” (2004), complemented 
by his analysis of the party’s ideological makeover, “Changing course or changing clothes?” 
(2007).  Chilton (2004) gives an excellent overview of techniques employed in political 
discourse, especially in the construction of “foreigners” with reference to Enoch Powell’s 
“Rivers of Blood” speech and the use of legitimising and delegitimising strategies, 
appropriation of victimhood, agency, entailment, presupposition, presumption, frames and 
metaphors.  The tactic of reversing the accusation of racism is investigated by Van Dijk 
(1993, 1998), Renton (2003, 2005), Pitcher (2006) and Kundnani (2007).  Charteris-Black 
(2005) builds on this pool of resources with his investigation of personification and 
depersonification and Critical Metaphor Analysis.  The use of metaphor in political discourse 
has grown from Lakoff & Johnson’s (1980) and Van Teeffelen’s (1994) work on metaphor 
and racism, to become a popular area of examination in recent years in CDA with 
2 – Review of the literature 
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Fairclough’s “Language and Power” (2001) setting the foundations for works such as 
Charteris-Black’s (2006) analysis of the immigration metaphors “natural disaster” and 
“container” in the 2005 campaign, Hart’s (2007) CDA and metaphor work with the 2005 
BNP manifesto and Polson & Kahle’s (2010) study of the metaphorical construction of “the 
Other”.  Richardson and Wodak’s (2009) examination of BNP leaflets, Richardson’s work on 
of the use of “Britishness” (2008), Atton’s (2006) analysis of online materials, Wood and 
Finlay’s (2008) investigation of BNP depictions of Muslims following the London bombings 
and Woodbridge’s (2010) work on the appropriation of Christian credentials are all incisive 
and revealing studies of current BNP discourse.  Finally, Rhodes’ study of legitimisation, 
“The Banal National Party”, Holmes’ “Integral Europe” (2000) and John & Margetts’ inquiry 
into the phenomenon of “latent” BNP support underline the manner in which discourse plays 
a central role in normalisation of extreme groups.     
 To date, BNP materials have mainly been analysed either from the perspective of 
Discourse Analysis (DA) or within a particular framework of Critical Discourse Analysis 
(CDA).  Metaphor analysis has received much attention, and so will not be addressed here.  
As we are concerned with how the discourse has changed between the two texts, the most 
appropriate method would seem to be Corpus Analysis.  Wordlists and concordances alone, 
of course, are insufficient to reveal the subtleties of usage needed to gain an accurate 
understanding of the trends involved.  Corpus Analysis, therefore, forms the basis for the 
investigation of variation, following which, an analysis incorporating techniques and 
concepts from both DA and CDA will be employed to interpret and explain those tendencies 
identified.  The paper is based on a Corpus Analysis using Mike Scott’s Wordsmith Tools, 
forming wordlists and concordances, and applying principles of DA and CDA to identify 
3 – Research design and method 
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trends and the reasoning behind them.  The analysis focuses on the construction of “in-
groups” identified by references of pronouns and key lexical items. 
4. - A corpus analysis of “in-groups” in the 2005 and 2010 BNP manifestos
4.1 Pronouns and “BNP” 
   
 Fig. 4.1 shows the instances of self-references in the two manifestos and their total 
number of occurrences.  Percentages of the relevant text are provided in order to account for 
the difference in word count between the two manifestos (25,664 words in 2005 and 29,790 
in 2010). 
Fig. 4.1 – Self-references in 2005 & 2010 manifestos 
Word No. of occurrences 2005 No. of occurrences 2010 
BNP 33 (0.13%) 372 (1.25%) 
I 1 1 
my 0 1 
we 329 (1.28%) 236 (0.80%) 
us 34 (0.15%) 5 (0.02%) 
our 197 (0.76%) 197 (0.66%) 
ours 2 0 
ourselves 5 (0.02%) 0 
TOTAL 601 812 
 
         Whilst we notice a significant drop in the use of the first person plural subject pronoun 
“we” and the first person plural object pronoun “us”, the most striking difference is the 
increase in the occurrence of “”BNP”, which grew from 33 (0.13%) in 2005 to 372 (1.25%) 
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in 2010.  Closer inspection reveals that “BNP” replaced “we” to a large extent in the subject 
position and “us” in the object position.  The result of this is that the pronouns, which may be 
interpreted in numerous ways, such as representing humankind, “ethnically British” people, 
“civically British” people, the BNP, the BNP leadership or the British nation state have been 
replaced by a single representative organ.  Whereas in 2005, policies would be expressed by 
the use of the inclusive but potentially vague pronoun: “We will enact laws that will ensure 
that the dictatorship of the media over free debate in our society is dismantled” (BNP, 2005, 
p.9), 2010’s manifesto declares: “The BNP will enact legislation which will hold journalists 
and their media outlets criminally liable for knowingly publishing falsehoods” (BNP, 2010, 
p.43).   
 Such a dramatic increase in the use of the party name requires explanation.  It may 
primarily be seen as symbolic of the growing confidence within the party in this period.  Few 
would deny that the name BNP has historically been synonymous with street-level violence 
and racist thuggery.  As the party began its cosmetic transformation under Nick Griffin, its 
first real attempt at a mainstream manifesto (2005) seemed reluctant to mention the name 
which for the vast majority of the electorate would conjure such negative associations as to 
turn them away immediately.  It was, it seemed, the political party that dared not speak its 
name.  Thus, in 2005, legitimisation of ideas and policies was attempted by backgrounding 
the name which caused such negative reactions.  By 2010, the BNP’s confidence has grown 
to such a degree that the name of the party is constantly and proudly declared.  It is, perhaps, 
the most potent symbol of growth in confidence that the party which once appeared to 
apologetically shrink from the acronym and its associations in its first foray into the wider 
political arena now places its name as a rallying point at the heart of the campaign.  The name 
has subsumed the first person pronouns. The message is clear – the in-group’s interests are 
identical to, and can only be served by, the BNP.   
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 The increase in the use of the name not only demonstrates the growth in confidence 
and perceived legitimacy within the party, but is also an act of legitimisation in itself.  
Chilton (2004) outlines the dual methods of epistemic and deontic legitimisation exercised in 
political discourse.  Whereas the latter employs methods which appeal to the emotional and 
moral sense of the audience, the former is grounded in rational and objective “facts” which 
are given credibility through the authority of the speaker.  In the field of party politics, the 
party name is an essential badge of identity which aids the construction of this 
authoritativeness.   
4.2 Detailed study – “our”  
 A truly comprehensive corpus analysis would analyse each of these in-group 
pronouns by creating a concordance of their contexts and categorising their usage. Due to 
spatial limitations, we shall examine only one example more closely.  Due to the fact that it 
appears exactly the same number of times in both texts (197 occurrences, constituting 0.76% 
of the 2005 manifesto and 0.66% in 2010), the first person plural possessive pronoun “our” 
seems a logical choice, seeing as it is the only numerous word whose regularity has not 
significantly altered over the five year period (see Fig. 4.1).  However, the mere fact that 
there has not been a noticeable change in the number of instances of the word does not 
provide the whole picture. In order to determine whether its usage has remained consistent, 
one must examine its individual instances to establish the identity of the self which is being 
evoked.  Its selection for investigation is also appealing as it is such an important and emotive 
word, denoting as it does, a collective ownership which is so central to the identity politics 
employed by the BNP (the subtitle of the 2010 manifesto was “Democracy, Freedom, Culture 
and Identity”).  Its usage is far from straightforward, however.  As Gee (2005) suggests, 
words may be seen as discourse models; representations of items in the world which hold 
very different associations for each person.  For this reason, one must be extremely cautious 
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in the interpretation of discourse items to carefully consider what associations, relevance and 
significance a word may have.   
 Figures 4.2 (2005) and 4.3 (2010) show the usage of “our” and the version of the in-
group to which it relates, whether the British nation state, the British people or the BNP.  As 
there must exist a certain amount of subjectivity in the interpretation of the in-group to which 
they refer, they are presented as a Venn diagram in order to preserve the overlap of referents 
which it is possible to have.  Taking the first instance of “our” in the 2005 manifesto: 
“’Rebuilding British Democracy’ is the title of our general election manifesto for a very good 
reason” (p.3), the use of “our” clearly refers to the BNP only.  On the other hand, the 
following sentence is taken from the 2010 manifesto, and may be interpreted as 
encompassing all three referents: “There is far too much emphasis on collective security, 
embracing nations that are not always well disposed to our viewpoint” (p.13).  In this manner, 
each possible combination is accounted for. 
 An examination of the results reveals that the use of “our” in the 2005 manifesto was 
fairly evenly spread across the categories, with a roughly equal number of references to each 
group as a unique subject, i.e. not sharing in-group identity with any other category.  There is 
also a clear cluster of uses in which the possessive pronoun could refer to both the British 
nation and British people.  To clarify this point, it must be stated at this juncture that when 
the BNP talks of “British people”, it is referring to what it terms “ethnically British” or 
“indigenous” British people, i.e. white people (for a discussion of this point, see section 4.3).  
By 2010 we indeed see a significant change in the word’s use, as references to the British 
nation state far outstrip other manifestations of collective ownership, with 92 instances of 
“our” referring uniquely to the British nation.  This is accounted for by a reduction in each of 
the other categories.   
12 
 
Fig. 4.2 – Referents of “our” in 2005 manifesto 
 
Fig. 4.3 – Referents of “our” in 2010 manifesto 
  
British 
Nation (59) 
British 
People 
(45) 
BNP (51) 
British 
Nation (92) 
British 
People 
(34) 
BNP (36) 
(36) 
 
(0) 
(2) 
(4) 
(24) 
(4) 
(1) 
(6) 
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 What, then, is the significance of such a change?  This may, once more, be seen as 
another step in the process of legitimisation, and as symbolic of the growing self-assurance of 
the BNP leadership.  Its relevance lies in the shift from articulating the desires of the party 
and attempting to speak for the “British” people, to the much wider assertion of authority to 
speak for the country and presuming the power to influence the nation state.  Such a bold 
authority claim of the type discussed above speaks of a party whose self-image has altered 
significantly, or is attempting to portray significantly loftier intentions.  The claim constitutes 
a speech act which asserts itself on a higher political plain as yet unoccupied by the BNP.   
Regarding the use of the object pronoun “us”, the 2005 text shows a total of 34 widely 
distributed references:  10 uses relate to British people, 5 to the British nation, and 10 could 
be seen as referring to both people and nation; 3 represent the BNP, 4 uses relate to 
humankind, the British and Irish combined and the English have a single mention each.  In 
2010, only 5 instances occur, and the plurality of the in-group has disappeared. Gone are the 
references to the English, the Irish and humankind.  In 2010, every remaining usage refers to 
Britain as a nation in the context of international relations.  This is a further indication that, in 
terms of its manifesto at least, the party has abandoned the discourse of the little man riling 
against the powers that be, and has elected to adopt a more statesmanlike approach by 
invoking the authority of nationhood.  This change in direction may also be seen in terms of 
what Condor (cited in Richardson, 2008) has named “banal nationalism”; this is an example 
of legitimisation by presupposition (Chilton, 2004).  
4.3 Britain and the British 
 This move from the personal to the national may appear, at first glance, to be a shift 
from a preoccupation with an exclusive group of people to a more inclusive identification 
with the nation.  One may be forgiven for presuming that this change marks the beginning of 
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an outlook which embraces the nation and all within it, as opposed to one favoured group.  
However, this distinction is rather more pertinent when we remind ourselves of what is meant 
when the BNP uses the word “British”.  Prior to the Equality and Human Rights Commission 
winning the case on opening up membership to non-whites, the BNP’s racial composition 
was entirely white.  Despite the change, there have understandably been few applicants from 
other ethnic backgrounds, and the EHRC has since had a subsequent ruling upheld that the 
revised constitution remains indirectly racially discriminatory as it requires members to 
oppose mixed-race relationships and support the repatriation of non-whites (EHRC, 2010).  
Therefore, when the BNP refers to itself, there can be little doubt that we are dealing with a 
group composed entirely of whites.  Moving on to the next group, that of British people, one 
might expect to be discussing people from a variety of ethnic backgrounds.  Whilst this group 
constitutes a far wider section of the community, we would be mistaken to assume it includes 
any non-white members.  The 2005 version of the BNP Guide to Language Discipline (cited 
by Richardson and Wodak, 2009, p.261) included the following instruction to its members: 
 Rule #15. BNP activists and writers should never refer to ‘black Britons’ or ‘Asian 
 Britons’ etc, for the simple reason that such persons do not exist. These people are 
 ‘black residents’ of the UK etc, and are no more British than an Englishman living in 
 Hong Kong is Chinese. 
It is clear, then, that when the BNP speaks of British people, it is essential to bear in mind 
that this specifically refers to white British people.  Thus, though Gordon Brown and Nick 
Griffin found themselves sharing the same slogan of “British jobs for British people” in the 
run-up to the 2009 European elections (Summers, 2009; Richardson 2008), the two phrases 
entail a significant and ethnically determined difference.  It is precisely this difference which 
we must consider when assessing whether a change to a discourse which speaks of a nation 
rather than one which is concerned with its people is actually more inclusive.  Evidently, it is 
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equally exclusive of any group which is not white.  Perhaps more disturbingly still, this is a 
discourse which disguises its racism in the language of inclusivity, representing as it does, a 
nation run by and for a single racial group, to the exclusion of all others.  With this in mind, 
an analysis of the occurrence of words connected with nationhood yields interesting results.  
From 2005 to 2010, the instances of “British” increase from 108 (0.42%) to 191 (0.64%), a 
rise in actual occurrences of 76.85%; “Britain” grows from 117 (0.45%) to 171 (0.58), or 
46.15% overall, and “UK” shoots from 14 (0.05%) to 50 (0.17%) constituting a quantitative 
increase of 257.14%.  Clearly, this shift in self-representation in terms of nationhood is not 
limited to pronoun use.   
4.4 “Natives” vs. “Indigenous peoples” 
 A further manner in which the in-group, that is, white Britons, is constructed is 
through words which imply a historical link to a point in the past which acts as a “year zero”.  
That is, certain words suggest an ancient and ongoing connection between a group of people 
and a geographical area and suggest an “original” state.  These words do not permit a view of 
history in which there is constant movement and mixing of people, cultures and races, but 
rather assign a beginning point of history which must be considered the norm.  As Nick 
Griffin stated on the BBC’s Question Time programme (aired October 22nd 2009), the BNP’s 
year zero, the point in time chosen to represent the “original” British, is 17,000 years ago, just 
after the last mini ice age.  The primary word chosen to express this condition in the 2005 
text is “native”, appearing on 12 occasions (0.05%).  By 2010, this word’s usage had dropped 
to 5 instances (0.02%).  But, as illustrated by Griffin’s explanation on Question Time, this is 
not a concept which has fallen out of favour in BNP discourse.  On the contrary, it has simply 
been replaced by the word “indigenous”.  The word occurred only 4 times (0.02%) in 2005, 
but by 2010 had all but replaced the previous word to appear on 14 occasions (0.05%).   
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 The reason for this is twofold.  Firstly, the abandonment of the word “native” may be 
as a result of the imagery conjured by a word which, for a party so preoccupied with British 
history and the British empire, evokes the Victorian discourse of spear-throwing savages 
subject to civilised Imperial rule.  As Smith (2006), who discusses the use of the two words 
and their associations, reports: “How often do we read in the newspaper about the death or 
murder of a Native man, and in the same paper about the victimisation of a female Native, as 
though we were a species of sub-human animal life?” (p.9). This is hardly a role to which the 
BNP would aspire.  On the other hand, the word “indigenous” does not carry the strong 
associations, as suggested above by Smith, with being “primitive”.  It is a word more 
associated with efforts at a governmental level to preserve ancient and threatened cultures.  It 
is a word more commonly used to describe noble civilisations which have suffered injustice 
at the hands of complacent or complicit authority, and which require nurture and protection to 
redress the balance.  It is also a word which, in the simplest terms, drops the “sub-human” 
and boosts the “victimisation”.  This is another method of legitimisation, whereby the 
oppressor appropriates the language of the oppressed.  As Back (cited in Atton, 2006) states, 
“the language of hate is increasingly being articulated through invocations of love” (p.576).  
This new approach of the evocation of victimhood by the BNP is specifically designed to 
suggest that “the implicit racism of the BNP is born out of suffering and repression, not 
hatred” (Atton, 2006, p.580).    
4.5 White people 
 This discussion of the appropriation of the discourse of victimhood leads us neatly on 
to the examination of that most blatant and open reference to the in-group: the use of the 
word “white” in reference to race.  For a party so preoccupied, as we have seen, with what 
Richardson and Wodak (2009) refer to as the BNP’s “biological racism” (p.261), one may be 
surprised to note that the use of the word “white” occurs only 5 times in the 2005 manifesto, 
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and that only 3 of those refer to race.  The first talks of “the ‘positive discrimination’ schemes 
that have made white Britons second-class citizens” (p.14); the second bemoans “a quasi-
Marxist cultural war against all things white, European and male” (p.22); and the final 
example, somewhat out of left field, criticises the BBC for its depiction of “the white 
working class - in the most negative and unattractive light possible” (p.22).  All three 
examples paint the white majority as victims, in line with the appropriation outlined above, 
and the white identity evoked is both male and working-class.  The fact that only three uses 
appear is a clear example of how far the party had already come, under Griffin’s stewardship, 
in disguising its ethnocentric ideology under its various euphemisms.  Furthermore, the 
evocation of victimhood was a far cry from Griffin’s declaration in the BNP magazine The 
Rune in 1995, that the defence of “rights for whites” would only be achieved by “well-
directed boots and fists” (Atton, 2006, p.576).   
 As we have seen, by 2005, the BNP had adopted both the discourse of the victim and 
a discourse which, according to Rule #8 of the Language and Concepts Discipline Manual 
was “couched in language calculated to be relevant to [the audience’s] interests”.  In this, its 
first attempt at a fully-fledged manifesto, the party had already abandoned (in public, it must 
be stressed) the language of regular and overt reference to race, knowing that this would not 
be welcomed by a wider public.  One might expect, then, that this trend would continue in the 
2010 text, and that overt references to race would be rare, replaced by euphemistic usage of 
words such and “British” or “indigenous”, as previously discussed.  However, the 2010 
manifesto yields 11 examples of the word “white” and 1 of “whites”, and this time, each one 
refers to race.  An examination of the concordance shows two examples concerned with what 
the BNP calls “white flight” or “indigenous emigration” – that is, white people leaving the 
city purportedly due to non-white immigration.  This group appears distinct from, or at least 
includes a wider range than, the white working class of the 2005 manifesto, defined as it is by 
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“vital technical skills” (p.69), and is an indication of the party’s attempts to attract more 
middle class support.  The white working class appears twice in 2010, once again in its 
negative portrayal by the media, and also as a victim of abandonment by “Labour’s globalist 
ideals” (p.22), but there is no mention of males.   
 The discourse of victimhood is taken up a level in 2010, with the language of racial 
abuse appropriated and reversed. We are informed that “whites are overwhelmingly the 
victims of racially motivated crime” (p.18) and are presented with statistics from the “well 
known researcher Tony Shell” (who, according to the anti-fascist group Searchlight, is the 
BNP’s Plymouth organiser [Gable, 2008]) that “white victims of racist murders are over-
represented” (ibid.).  In contrast to the 2005 text, we see children presented in terms of race 
and are told that “Asian pupils outnumber white children” in primary schools (p.17) and that 
in 2005, “36 percent of all births in England and Wales were not “white British” (ibid.).  
However, of the twelve references to “white” in the 2010 manifesto, the largest number relate 
to girls and females.  In a new approach employing the racialisation of crime (p.33), we hear 
of the “grooming of white girls for sex” and the “growing concern at the attitudes of some 
Asian men towards white girls”; that “white girls as young as 12 are being targeted for sex”, 
and “young white females are lured in sex abuse traps by Muslim males”.   
 In this manner, the usage of the word “white” to signify the in-group has made a 
surprising and significant reappearance, following its near abandonment in the 2005 text.  In 
2005, “whiteness” was perhaps seen as too blatant a badge of identity and racial 
preoccupation, and though associated with victimhood, the vulnerable group which was 
constructed was very definitely male and working class.  In 2010, whilst there remain two 
references to the working class, this has been accompanied by an equal number of references 
to the “white flight” of technically skilled employees, constituting a widening of the socio-
economic demographic being targeted.  Most significantly, however, is the disappearance of 
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men, replaced with girls, children and babies as the vulnerable victims.  Perhaps the ultimate 
in “apple pie” concepts, with which no-one could argue, the protection of the most 
defenceless in society is guaranteed to elicit an emotive response.  As expressed by Atton 
(2006), “the BNP is anti-multicultural, anti-equality and anti-freedom, yet its discourse uses 
the tropes of multiculturalism, equality and freedom to maintain an ideological space where 
racism and repression may appear natural and commonsensical” (p.586).  Thus, the BNP has 
reintroduced the word “white” into its discourse by distancing itself from a male identity and 
widening its socioeconomic focus beyond the working class whilst simultaneously stepping 
up its discourse of victimhood by switching the victim status from working class white men 
to white girls, children and babies, which has been achieved by a process of the racialisation 
of crime.   
4.6 Humans  
To conclude this analysis of the construction of the in-group, let us briefly examine 
the use of what may be considered, in most other texts at least, to be perhaps the ultimate 
inclusive in-group – humanity.  In 2005 we see 23 uses of “human”, 2 of “humane” and 2 of 
“humanity”.  These 27 references relate to general concepts such as human nature, diversity, 
cultures, populations, misery, tragedy and history, and speak of our “non-human” animal 
relatives.  The tone is one of the “celebration of diversity” and difference.  Lest we suspect 
for a moment that this may be translated as parity, it is also clearly stated that the BNP “do 
not accept the absurd superstition – propagated for different though sometimes overlapping 
reasons by capitalists, liberals, Marxists and theologians - of human equality” (p.17).  
Nevertheless, the frequent mention of “humans” and “humanity” does have the effect of 
establishing the existence of some larger unifying group, whatever the perception of groups 
within it.  This invocation of our basic humanity conjures ideas of our species-wide 
civilisation, and of unity at least at some level.   
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Though the previous sentence may seem to be a rather obvious statement, its 
relevance becomes pertinent as we examine the most recent text.  In 2010, references to 
“human” drop to 11, with one use of “humane”.  However, it is not only the quantitative 
evaluation which demonstrates a discursive shift.  A qualitative analysis of usage in context 
yields one reference to the need for a “just and humane” welfare system, mirroring the 
meaning of “fairness” mentioned earlier.  One use of “human” employs the word to support 
its “celebration of difference” approach: “Group identity, belonging, loyalty and allegiance, 
in other words, are not products of ‘false consciousness’, economics, imperialism or 
sociological processes; they are an essential part of elementary human nature” (p.22).  
However, the overwhelming majority of the uses of the word are capitalised.  The reason for 
this is that they all form the titles of organisations or laws designed to protect human rights, 
and in every case, they are opposed.  In all 3 references to the “Equalities and Human Rights 
Commission” (the body which judged the BNP constitution to be discriminatory), it is 
prefixed with the verb “repeal”.  The same is true of the “Human Rights Act”, which appears 
on 4 occasions, again in the context of its dissolution.  The remaining 3 uses refer to the 
“European Convention on Human Rights”, in each case accompanied by the intention to 
“withdraw from” it.  In 2005, we also see 14 uses of “rights”, all of which are positive.  By 
2010, this figure increases to 29, half of which are negative.  Between the texts, rights have 
moved from being something positive to be protected, to something pernicious to be feared.  
In what seems a conscious decision to cease highlighting the shared humanity of our species, 
and instead speak of humans only in opposition to organisations which support the concept of 
equality between people of all races, the BNP has rather subtly taken the most drastic step in 
the delegitimisation of “the other”.  As Chilton (2004) stresses:  
Delegitimisation can manifest itself in acts of negative other-presentation, acts of 
 blaming, scape-goating, marginalising, excluding, attacking the moral character of 
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 some individual or group, attacking the communicative cooperation of the other, 
 attacking the rationality and sanity of the other. The extreme is to deny the 
 humanness of the other. (p.47)   
 Taken as a whole, the total number of the most overt self-reference words (personal 
pronouns, the explicit acronym “BNP”, Britain/British/UK, native/indigenous and 
white/whites) sees an overall rise from 861 (3.34%) to 1254 (4.22%) as a proportion within 
their respective texts, and representing a rise in actual occurrences of 45.64%.  This is clearly 
a significant change in perspective, as policies and ideas are now articulated much more in 
terms of the in-group.   
 The BNP’s discursive makeover is clearly ongoing, and the research conducted yields 
a number of patterns of note. The corpus analysis showed a party gaining in confidence, no 
longer being coy in the use of the name “BNP”, indicative of their faith that the name no 
longer conjures such negative imagery.  The study of “our” and “British” shows the increased 
disguising of the racially constructed in-group behind the ostensibly inclusive discourse of 
nationhood.  We have also seen a rise in the appropriation of the discourse of victimhood and 
the racialisation of crime exercised through the use of “indigenous” and “white”, and the 
abandonment of the ultimate inclusive term “human” except for derision and attack. 
5 – Conclusions 
 Overall, one cannot say how much BNP gains and losses during the period may be put 
down to these changes in discourse, as it is only one of many socioeconomic factors affecting 
voting patterns.  However, it is clear that the discourse is indeed changing, and growing more 
sophisticated in its knowledge of techniques of disguising racial prejudice.  It is hoped that by 
identifying such methods and by drawing attention to them, we may be in a better position to 
refute their reasoning and expose their true purpose.     
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7 - Appendices 
Appendix i
Year 
 - BNP General Election results 1983-2010 (adapted from Ford & Goodwin, 
2010) 
Votes Constituencies 
contested 
Average in 
seats 
contested 
(%) 
Highest vote 
(%) 
Deposits 
retained 
1983 14,621 54 0.6 1.3 0 
1987 553 2 0.5 0.6 0 
1992 7,005 13 1.2 3.6 0 
1997 35,832 56 1.4 7.5 3 
2001 47,129 33 3.9 16.4 7 
2005 192,746 119 4.9 16.9 34 
 
2010 564,331* 339* N/A 14.6* 72† 
 
* Source: BBC (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/election2010/results) 
† Source: Hodge, M. (May 28th, 2010) 
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